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We propose an overlapping generations framework in which life expectancy
is determined endogenously by governmental health investments. As a nov-
elty, we are able to examine the feedback effects between life expectancy and
R&D-driven economic growth for the transitional dynamics. We find that i)
higher survival induces economic growth through higher savings and higher
labor force participation; ii) longevity-induced reductions in fertility hamper
economic development; iii) the positive life expectancy effects of larger savings
and higher labor force participation outweigh the negative effect of a reduction
in fertility, and iv) there exists a growth-maximizing size of the health care
sector that might lie beyond what is observed in most countries. Altogether,
the results support a rather optimistic view on the relationship between life
expectancy and economic growth and contribute to the debate surrounding
rising health shares and economic development.
JEL classification: I15, J11, J13, J17, O41.
Keywords: Long-run growth, horizontal innovation, increasing life expectancy,
welfare effects of changing longevity, size of health-care sectors.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decades, mortality has decreased at an historically unprecedented
pace all over the world. As depicted in Figure 1, on a global level, life expectancy
at birth has increased from 52.6 years in 1960 to 72.4 years in 2017. Nonetheless,
substantial differences between different regions of the world remain. Over the same
time period, the real GDP p.c. has risen roughly by a factor of 3.5 from $4,254 to
$14,574 (Roser, 2019).
Figure 1: Life expectancy at birth, 1960–2017






















Source: World Bank (2019)
In the literature, the following important reasons for increasing life expectancy
have been proposed: medical progress, economic development, increased health
shares and behavioral changes (see, for example, Christensen and Vaupel, 1996;
Harper, 2014; Currie and Schwandt, 2016; Dwyer-Lindgren et al., 2017). However,
the dynamic interrelations between life expectancy and economic development are
less clear.
Economists have tried to shed light on the correlation and causality between
health and income. The Preston curve (see Preston, 1975) provides interesting in-
sights by highlighting the positive correlation between the development status and
the health status of a country, which flattens out for high levels of income. Further-
more, as Bloom et al. (2019) show, the Preston curve has shifted upwards between
1960 and 2015 and still exhibits a strong positive correlation. All this points to
a relationship between health and income that requires further investigation. In a
prominent work, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) find a negative relationship between
health and economic growth by exploiting the epidemiological transition after 1940.
However, this result got challenged by several contributions. Critiques by Aghion
et al. (2011) and Bloom et al. (2014) mainly emphasize the role of initial health that
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is not considered in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). In fact, Cervellati and Sunde
(2011, 2015) show that the effect of health on economic growth hinges on a country’s
stage of the demographic transition. Economic growth in less developed countries
with high mortality and fertility might even decrease in better health because longer
lifetimes do not decrease fertility or raise educational investments. Therefore, higher
survival primarily raises the population size, potentially affecting p.c. income neg-
atively. Focusing on high income countries, the relationship between health and
economic growth reverses since higher survival reduces population growth and spurs
human capital investments. This negative relationship is also supported by various
other works (for example Lorentzen et al., 2008; Cervellati and Sunde, 2013; Bloom
et al., 2014; Hansen and Lønstrop, 2015; Gehringer and Prettner, 2019). Given the
tremendous improvements in health care during large parts of the twentieth century,
infant and child mortality is contributing less and less to gains in life expectancy
in high income countries, leaving decreases in old-age mortality as the main en-
gine for future increases in individual life spans (Breyer et al., 2010; Eggleston and
Fuchs, 2012). Also, since health care sectors in high income countries are usually
well-developed, additional gains in life expectancy come at ever higher cost, thereby
raising the opportunity cost of health care, e.g. productive investments (Bhargava
et al., 2001).
To analyze the complex relationship within models of economic growth, two
dimensions can be distinguished – exogenous vs. endogenous life expectancy and
exogenous vs. endogenous growth frameworks. There already exists quite a rich
literature on exogenous life expectancy effects in both exogenous and endogenous
growth models (see, for example, Blanchard, 1985; Reinhart, 1999; Heijdra and
Romp, 2008; Prettner, 2013; Baldanzi et al., 2019). These models usually empha-
size the saving effect, the role of human capital and the corresponding effects on
productivity and provide an important basis for a better understanding of the con-
sequences of changes in the lifetime horizon for economic growth. Nonetheless, no
feedback effects on longevity can be considered, which limits the models’ explanatory
power. Life expectancy has been endogenized mostly in exogenous growth models
as in Boucekkine et al. (2002), Chakraborty (2004) and Fanti and Gori (2014),
where life expectancy increases in the public resources directed toward health or in
the level of human capital. Given the endogenous nature of technological progress,
these models are also limited in their explanatory power. Last, there is the cat-
egory of models incorporating both endogenous survival and endogenous growth.
Contributions from this category are rare. A recent paper by Kuhn and Prettner
(2016) introduces individual survival into a Romer (1990) type of economy, where
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life expectancy increases in the health care personnel. The authors find a hump-
shaped relationship between the size of the health care sector (which determines life
expectancy) and economic growth. However, in their analysis they solely focus on
balanced growth path effects with constant fertility and an exogenous health care
sector.
To provide additional insights, we fully endogenize life expectancy similar to
Chakraborty (2004) and combine it with a discrete time endogenous growth frame-
work in the vein of Romer (1990) and Jones (1995). Old-age life expectancy increases
in output per worker as well as in the health tax levied by the government. Addi-
tionally, there is a quantity-quality tradeoff in the sense that adults have to decide
on the number of children to have as well as on the children’s education. We include
three channels through which changes in the survival probability (and vice versa)
can affect economic development: the saving rate, fertility and labor force partici-
pation. Given an increase in the lifetime horizon, individuals save a larger fraction
of their income to account for the prolonged retirement period (Bloom et al., 2007,
2010). To finance the increase in savings, adult consumption and fertility decrease
and labor force participation increases (for works on the fertility and labor force
participation effects of health see Zhang and Zhang, 2005; Angeles, 2010; Cai, 2010;
Garćıa-Gómez, 2011). We show that, in principle, longer individual lifespans foster
economic growth, as the positive saving and labor force participation effects out-
weigh the negative fertility effect. For a constant survival probability as well as for
an over-sized health care sector, economic growth slows down.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model structure
by implementing endogenous life expectancy into a R&D-based growth framework.
In Section 3, the balanced growth path is derived analytically. In Sections 4 and 5,
we calibrate the model to U.S. data and use the results to further investigate the
feedback effects between life expectancy and economic growth. Finally, in Section
6, we draw conclusions and discuss potentials for future research.
2 The model
2.1 Consumption side
In the vein of Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965), the economy is populated by
three single-sex overlapping generations: children, young adults and retirees. Child-
hood lasts for 20 years, adulthood for 40 years and, depending on the probability to
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survive to old age, φt, retirement lasts for up to 40 years.
1 Consequently, the max-
imum possible lifespan an individual can reach is 100 years. This is as in Baldanzi






with bt being the health status of an adult. We closely follow Chakraborty (2004),
such that bt increases in the public resources devoted to health (see also Preston,







φt (bt) = 0,
• lim
bt→∞
φt (bt) = 1.
There is a strictly concave non-decreasing relationship between governmental health
investments and life expectancy. In the limits, if φ = 0, the corresponding life
expectancy equals 60 years and if φ = 1, individuals reach the maximum life ex-
pectancy of 100 years with certainty.
As a simplification, all economically relevant decisions are made by the adult
generation. We implicitly assume that children’s consumption needs are covered
for by parental consumption. Adults supply up to one unit of labor and, exactly
after half of their adult period, give birth to n number of children who will become
adults when their parents finish adulthood. Retirees consume out of the savings
accumulated and die with certainty at the end of the period, leaving zero bequests.
Maximum lifetime utility is then determined by a consumption-saving decision and
by choosing the number of children, nt, to have and the children’s educational level,
et. Consequently, individual utility is given by
ut = ln(c1,t) + φtβ ln(c2,t+1) + ξ ln(nt) + θ ln(et), (1)
where c1,t is adult consumption in period t, c2,t+1 is old-age consumption in period
t+ 1 and β, ξ, θ ∈ (0, 1) are the utility weights of old-age consumption, fertility and
1Focusing on well-developed countries only, we assume that all children survive to adulthood.
For interrelations between economic development, fertility and child mortality see Cigno (1998).
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children’s education, respectively. Individuals need to satisfy two constraints




Equation (2) describes the economic constraint of an adult. Labor income depends
on the wage rate per effective labor, wt, on the level of individual human capital,
ht, and on the labor force participation rate, 1−ψnt− ηntet. As in Galor and Weil
(2000), we assume that labor supply decreases in the fertility rate to account for the
time spent raising children. Furthermore, as a simplification, we follow Prettner and
Werner (2016) in assuming home education.2 Consequently, labor force participation
decreases in the time cost of raising children, ψ, in education, et, and in the time
requirements for educating children, η. Labor income of an adult in period t can
then be spent on consumption during adulthood and on savings, st, for retirement.
Equation (3) captures individual old-age consumption. As in standard over-
lapping generations frameworks, the only self-determined source of income during
retirement are interest payments on the savings accumulated in the previous pe-
riod. This is reflected in stRt+1. To account for individuals’ savings who die before
reaching retirement, we follow Yaari (1965), Blanchard (1985), Chakraborty (2004)
and Baldanzi et al. (2019) and implement perfect and fair annuity markets which
insure individuals against the risk of dying with positive bequests before reaching
the retirement stage. More specifically, at the end of adulthood, all adults invest
their savings in a mutual life insurance fund. Individuals who survive to retirement
receive two transfers, their deposited savings and transfers of individuals’ savings
who died. This is accounted for by dividing stRt+1 by φt.
3 In so doing, the individual
saving behavior reflects the exact anticipated life expectancy. Combining Equations
(1), (2) and (3), utility maximization yields the following optimality conditions
c1,t =
wtht
1 + ξ + βφt
, st =
βφtwtht










First and foremost, the wage rate per effective labor, wt, and the level of individual
2To slim down the model and to put the spotlight on life expectancy effects, we abstract from
baseline education that children acquire without formal schooling as in Strulik et al. (2013).
3Although, we do not explicitly include a pension system, the annuity dynamics are in line with
Cipriani (2014) who finds a negative relationship between population aging and financial transfers
received during retirement.
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human capital, ht, increase adult consumption and savings but have no direct effect
on the fertility and education decisions. This is due to fertility and education being
modeled in terms of time-opportunity cost rather than in terms of absolute cost.
There is an income-independent quantity-quality tradeoff, which is reflected in the
optimality conditions for nt and et. While the preferences for children, ξ, raise
fertility, they decrease educational efforts. The reverse holds true for the preferences
for education, θ. For the reminder of the paper, ξ > θ is assumed to rule out negative
fertility rates.
The effects of the survival probability, φt, are similar to the ones of the individual
discount factor, β. A change in life expectancy induces the same individual behavior
– the higher the probability to survive to old age, the less individuals discount
utility derived from future consumption. Therefore, both β and φt increase savings
and decrease consumption of adults. Also, fertility decreases in β and φt since
a higher preference for future consumption decreases the willingness of adults to
free resources for children These relationships are well-known from previous works
(Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002; Zhang and Zhang, 2005; Chen, 2010). However, since
our survival probability is endogenous, its marginal effects change as the economy
is growing. Therefore, the incentives to save and to have children change over time,
which, in turn, affects research and production. Given that capital accumulation,
population growth and technological progress are fundamental drivers of economic
development (Ramsey, 1928; Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965; Romer,
1990), implementing an endogenous life expectancy improves our understanding of
economic growth processes.
Inspecting the fertility rate more closely, we observe that it is constant in the









The same framework without lifetime uncertainty would yield a constant fertility
rate from the beginning on. The effect of economic development on fertility would
be abrogated which can be reasonable if focusing solely on advanced economies that
have exhibited low and relatively constant fertility rates over the last few decades
(Prettner and Werner, 2016). By introducing an endogenously determined life ex-
pectancy, it is possible to separate the longevity effect on fertility decisions from the
income effect on fertility decisions, which leads us to Remark 1.
Remark 1. Increases in life expectancy induce higher savings for retirement at the
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expense of reduced fertility.
These relationships are in line with the literature surrounding longevity and eco-
nomic growth (see Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002; Zhang and Zhang, 2005; Cervellati
and Sunde, 2005). Given that children born in period t become adults in period t+1,
the size of the labor force, Lt, evolves according to
Lt+1 =
ξ − θ
ψ(1 + ξ + βφt)
Lt.
Again, for sustained economic growth, life expectancy will be at its upper limit such
that population growth is constant in the long run. Turning towards human capital
creation, the law of motion for individual human capital is given by
ht+1 = AEetht.
Since home education is assumed, parents’ level of human capital, ht, the educa-
tional effort, et, and parents’ productivity in education, AE, determine the level of
individual human capital of the next generation. Economy-wide aggregate human
capital is then given by
Ht = htLt, (5)
and the labor force participation rate can be expressed as
Ωt =
1 + βφt
1 + ξ + βφt
. (6)
Combining Equations (5) and (6), the stock of aggregate human capital available
for production and R&D, H̃t, can be calculated as
H̃t = ΩtHt. (7)
The available stock of aggregate human capital determines overall labor input. Since
the labor force participation rate increases but fertility decreases in life expectancy,
the long-run effect is ambiguous and requires further investigation. We go into more
details in Sections 4 and 5.
2.2 Government
Similar to Barro (1990), the government finances its health spending by taxing
aggregate income, Y aggt , with a health tax, τ . It needs to keep a balanced budget at
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all times, i.e., health investments can only be financed by the tax income received
in the same period. The governmental constraint then reads
τY aggt = Bt,
where the left-hand side are aggregate governmental revenues and the right-hand side
is aggregate governmental health spending, Bt. Incorporating a medical technology,
λ, and remembering that the government only aims at improving adults’ health, the





Individuals’ health and, with it, the probability to survive to retirement increases in
the medical resources per adult invested and in the productivity of these investments.
2.3 Production side
The production side of the economy builds up on Romer (1990), Jones (1995) and
Prettner and Werner (2016). There are three sectors: the final goods sector, the
intermediate goods sector and the R&D sector. In short, employing scientists, new
ideas/blueprints are developed in the perfectly competitive R&D sector and are sold
to an intermediate goods producer who then becomes the monopolist in producing
that specific product for one period. The intermediate good of variant i, xit, is
produced in a one-for-one technology using physical capital, kt, as the only input.
Due to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition, the intermediate good
is sold with a mark-up over the market price to the final goods producer. The
operating profits are necessary to compensate for R&D expenses.4 The final goods
producer uses the intermediate good as well as final goods workers as inputs to
produce the final good under perfect competition.
Life expectancy affects productivity and production through two channels: ag-
gregate savings, St = stLt, and the available aggregate human capital, H̃t. Longevity-
induced changes in the saving behavior affect the capital that can be invested in in-
termediate goods companies, which, in turn, affects the production of new blueprints
and final goods production. The size of the labor force and with it also R&D and
final goods production, is affected twofold: on the one hand, through fertility, in-
creases in life expectancy reduce the future size of the workforce, on the other hand,
4The monopolist only owns the patent for one period. For all future periods, we assume that
the government sells the patent and invests the proceeds unproductively.
9
fewer children increase labor force participation.
The final good, Yt, is produced according to









where HYt denotes workers employed in final goods production, At is the number
of differentiated blueprints developed until time t, xit is the number of machines
for each blueprint i used in final goods production and α is the elasticity of final
output with respect to machines. We include (1−τ) to account for the governmental
health tax.5 Perfect competition ensures that all production factors are paid their
marginal value products, such that the wage per effective worker, wYt , and the price























Turning to the monopolistic intermediate goods sector, the profit function of inter-






Combining Equations (9) and (10) and using kit = x
i
t, profit maximization results in
∂πx,it
∂kit




The more differentiated the intermediate goods are, i.e., the smaller α is, the more
market power the monopolist has and the higher the mark-up over the market
price is. Since all monopolists are similar, we can infer from Equation (11) that all
monopolists charge the same price and produce the same amount, i.e., pit = pt and
xit = xt. Therefore, dropping the machine variety index i, the aggregate production
function can be written as







5This formulation corresponds to the government taxing capital and labor income at equal
rates.
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where Kt = Atkt is aggregate capital. The production function has now the same
Cobb-Douglas form as in standard neoclassical growth models (see, for example,
Solow, 1956).
Moving on to the R&D sector, new ideas are developed according to the following
knowledge production function
At+1 − At = δAχtHAt . (12)
HAt are scientists employed in R&D. Their productivity depends on the general
productivity in research, δ, and on the number of already existing ideas (standing
on shoulders effect). We allow for intertemporal knowledge spillovers χ ∈ (0, 1) to
partly nest the Jones (1995) framework. Given the price of a patent, pAt , and the








t − wAt HAt .
Perfect competition then allows to derive an expression for wAt .
∂πAt
∂HAt
= 0 ⇔ wAt = pAt δA
χ
t . (13)
The wage per effective labor of scientists depends on the price that can be charged
for one blueprint and on scientists’ overall productivity.
2.4 Market clearing
The first condition for an equilibrium is that operating profits of the intermediate
goods producer, πxt , and the price of a patent, p
A
t , equal. Combining Equations (9),
(10) and (11), we observe that this relationship holds for
pAt = π
x




The second condition for an equilibrium is that wages of workers and scientists
equal, wYt = w
A
t = wt. Equating Equations (8) and (13) and using Equation (14),







Considering that human capital is solely employed in final goods production and in
R&D, HAt is given as
HAt = H̃t −HYt . (16)
Inserting Equations (7) and (15) into Equation (16), we are able to derive an ex-
pression for aggregate human capital employed in R&D




Using Equation (17) in the knowledge production function, the equilibrium stock of
ideas evolves according to
At+1 = δA
χ














Since we are interested in the growth effects of changes in life expectancy, we inspect
Equation (19) with respect to φt. We observe that the survival probability enters
through the labor force participation rate, Ωt, which leads us to the following remark.
Remark 2. In the short run, through higher labor force participation, higher life
expectancy increases the rate at which new ideas are developed.






(1 + ξ + βφt)2
.
The denominator of this expression is always positive. For δ, β, ξ ∈ (0, 1) and for
the reasonable case of At > 0 and Ht > 0, the numerator is also positive, such that
the survival probability has a strictly positive effect on productivity growth in the
short run.
Last, capital accumulation needs to be derived. For full depreciation of physical
capital and since savings of period t are invested in period t + 1, the standard law
of motion for capital can be applied, where aggregate savings determine the stock
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of aggregate physical capital in the next period
Kt+1 = stLt.
Combining Equations (8) and (15), the wage rate per effective labor can be written
as






Together with the expression for individual savings, st, from Equation (4), the stock
of physical capital then evolves according to
Kt+1 = Ltht
βφt
1 + ξ + βφt






The survival probability, φt, enters positively through the propensity to save, (1 +
βφt)/(1+ξ+βφt). Economic progress that raises life expectancy entails a multiplying
effect, since a longer life span increases capital accumulation and, with it, economic
progress and life expectancy.
To sum up, for labor market and financial market clearing, we have the following












1 + ξ + βφt




























For a given set of parameters and by choosing initial values for the endogenous
variables A0, K0, L0 and h0, this system fully describes the evolution of our model
economy over time. Life expectancy, represented by the survival probability φt+1,
is, of course, also endogenous but is completely determined inside the model.
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3 Balanced growth path
The system above can be solved analytically by deriving its balanced growth path




φt (yt) = 1,
such that we can drop it in the BGP analysis. Accordingly, fertility is constant and




− 1 = ξ − θ
ψ(1 + ξ + β)
− 1.













− 1 = δAχ−1t
1 + β













where the term in square brackets represents the growth factor of aggregate human
capital. The BGP expressions for physical capital and for aggregate production can















where we note that gK = gY agg . Since there are no life expectancy effects in the long
run, which seems reasonable considering that life expectancy gains are slowing down
(see Olshansky et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2016), economic progress is solely driven by
growth in aggregate human capital and in the intertemporal knowledge spillovers.
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This result is similar to Prettner and Werner (2016). We summarize this is in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. As the economy progresses, life expectancy reaches an upper limit,
such that there are no more longevity-induced growth effects in the long run.
This proposition has to be treated with some caution. From an analytical per-
spective, setting φ = 1 in the long run is correct, however, it ignores level effects and,
most importantly, it ignores that life expectancy is still projected to further increase
over the next decades (Oeppen et al., 2002; Strulik and Vollmer, 2013; Kontis et al.,
2017). To account for that, we examine the transitional dynamics in Sections 4 and
5.
4 Simulation
To analyze the transitional dynamics and to discuss the plausibility of our results,
we compare the model dynamics to U.S. data over the period 1960–2017. Given the
scope of the paper, we aim at resembling developments in p.c. GDP, life expectancy
at birth, fertility and the population size. All data have been taken from the World
Bank (2019).
The parameter and initial values chosen are summarized in Table 1. The health
tax rate is set to 11.4%, which corresponds to the average U.S. national health
expenditure as percentage of GDP over the chosen time horizon (CMS.gov, 2019).
The discount factor of β = 0.67 implies an annual discount rate of 2%, which is in
line with Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The value of the elasticity of final output
with respect to intermediate inputs, α, is set to 0.3, which is close to the standard
value used in the literature (Jones, 1995; Acemoglu, 2009). Also, ψ = 0.08 is similar
to Strulik et al. (2013). All other values are chosen for the model to fit the U.S.
data as precisely as possible.
To ensure sure that the model resembles the economic development of the U.S.
reasonably well, Figures 2 and 3 show to the evolution of p.c. output and of the
population size in the data (dashed red line) and in the model (solid blue line).
Keeping in mind that the model economy consists of three overlapping generations,
the model population size needs to be derived first. We do so by calculating the size
of the entire population in period t as Popt = φt−1Lt−1 + Lt + 0.5ntLt, where the
first term refers to retirees, the second term are adults and the third term represents
children. The model p.c. GDP is then calculated by dividing aggregate output by
the population size, i.e., yt = Y
agg
t /Popt. We observe that p.c. GDP in the data
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Table 1: Parameter and initial values for the simulation
Parameter Value Parameter Value Variable Value
τ 0.114 α 0.3 A0 17.5
β 0.67 δ 6.5 K0 0.8
ψ 0.08 χ 0.076 L0 10
ξ 0.327 AE 1.65 h0 1
θ 0.181 η 0.16
λ 0.9
and in the model increase over time by a factor of three, approximately. In the
data, p.c. GDP growth accelerates in the 1980’s and 1990’s and partially slows
down afterwards. In the model, a similar trend is visible. Economic progress is
strong until around the year 2000 when the dot-com bubble burst and slows down
afterwards. Also, the increase in the size of the population matches the one in the
U.S.

















Figure 2: Evolution of p.c. output (model prediction: solid blue line; data: dashed
red line)



















Figure 3: Evolution of the population size (model prediction: solid blue line; data:
dashed red line)
Turning to the underlying driving forces of economic growth, changes in life
expectancy are of the main interest. U.S. life expectancy has been rising by ap-
proximately nine years from 1960–2010 and is stagnant since then. In Figure 4,
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the model life expectancy resembles the data quite well, only underestimating the
slowdown during the last decade. A critical examination, however, calls for caution.
The stagnant U.S. life expectancy is not driven by stagnant economic development
(as the model would suggest) but by several other aspects such as increased rates
of deaths of despair and unequal access to health services (Case and Deaton, 2015;
Dowell et al., 2017; Harper et al., 2017) that are out of the scope of this paper. Given
the positive effect of life expectancy on economic growth, discussed in Section 5, and
also supported by other studies (Lorentzen et al., 2008; Cervellati and Sunde, 2013;
Bloom et al., 2014), this result should rather be an incentive for governments to
improve health services in order to not only decrease mortality but to also promote
long-run growth. This conclusion is consistent with Baldanzi et al. (2019) where
increases in life expectancy increase both productivity and individual utility derived
from living longer. We further elaborate on that in the next section.



















Figure 4: Evolution of life expectancy (model prediction: solid blue line; data:
dashed red line)














Figure 5: Evolution of fertility (model prediction: solid blue line; data: dashed red
line)
Figure 5 visualizes the fertility effects of changes in the lifetime horizon. Fertility
data are transformed into the number of unisex adults to make them comparable
to the model results. In the data, there is a sharp decrease in fertility until the
mid 1970’s visible. Afterwards, fertility fluctuates just below the replacement level.
Obviously, in the model, the longevity-induced fertility decline is not able to explain
the sharp decrease we see in the data. However, the life expectancy effect becomes
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visible. For the chosen parameter values, over time, the model fertility rate declines
to 0.91 along the BGP and approaches the fertility rate that we observe in the data.
Remembering that the change in the model fertility is solely driven by changes in
life expectancy, there is another possible takeaway. The unisex U.S. fertility rate
has fallen by 0.95, while the model fertility rate has fallen by 0.13. Accordingly, the
model captures approximately 14% of the changes in fertility over that time horizon,
which leads us to Remark 3.
Remark 3. The model result suggests that over the period 1960–2017, 14% of the
observed decline in the U.S. fertility rate is due to increases in life expectancy.
This result can be explained as follows. The quantity-quality tradeoff initiated
through increases in income is usually assumed to be the main driver for reductions
in fertility (Becker and Lewis, 1973). Through the design of our model economy,
this tradeoff is non-existent over time and the only time-dependent effect remaining
is how a change in the lifetime horizon affects individual choices. In our case, as life
expectancy increases, individuals require higher savings for old-age consumption.
In a standard overlapping generations setting, reduced adult consumption would
be the only effect. In our setting, individuals additionally have the opportunity to
increase their lifetime earnings by working more, i.e., by increasing the labor force
participation rate. Therefore, they choose to have fewer children in order to increase
labor income. Although, this is typically not the main motivation for having fewer
children, it is one piece of the puzzle to explain fertility behavior and its economic
implications.
5 Comparative statics
To shed some light on the directions and the magnitudes of the described chan-
nels, we test how p.c. output in the calibrated model changes if life expectancy is
kept completely constant, respectively, if only single channels are switched off. As
displayed in Figure 6, in the baseline case with a fully endogenous survival proba-
bility, p.c. output increases by a factor of 2.93. To asses the overall effect, we keep
the economy-wide life expectancy in 1960 constant and observe a reduction in p.c.
output of 11.9% over 58 years. This result comes as expected and is in line with
the central conclusions of many other works (see, for example, Chakraborty, 2004;
Cervellati and Sunde, 2011; Prettner, 2013; Prettner and Trimborn, 2017). Without
any longevity-induced effects over time, there is less innovation and less capital,

















































Figure 6: Level of p.c. output keeping different channels constant
In a second step, we are interested in disentangling the aggregate life expectancy
effect. We do so by keeping the survival probability in savings, labor force partici-
pation and fertility constant, separately and sequentially. First of all, we notice that
all channels point in the expected directions. As life expectancy is switched off in
labor force participation, p.c. output decreases to 2.82. The effect is even stronger
for savings, where p.c. output in 2017 would only be at 2.42 times the level in 1960.
Combining both channels, the reduction in p.c. output amounts to 0.57 or 19.5%
in total. For fertility, the opposite effect can be observed. Ignoring the effect of
changes in longevity on the fertility decision, p.c. output increases by 0.008 because
of a larger workforce, which translates into a higher growth rate of new ideas. This
change seems reasonably small considering that only longevity-induced changes in
fertility are being accounted for. We summarize the findings of this comparative
static exercise in the following remark.
Remark 4. Through capital accumulation and the larger number of scientists and
workers, life expectancy induces economic growth. The positive effects of higher sav-
ings and higher labor force participation outweigh the negative one of lower fertility.
In principal, there are further potential effects that could be considered in future
works. Just to mention a few, including doctors and nurses as a third type of human
capital would impose an additional negative effect of life expectancy on economic
development since longer lives would reduce the share of human capital available for
production and R&D. One potential positive effect that has been abstracted from
in this analysis is the income-dependent quantity-quality tradeoff. Incorporating
longevity- or income-determined education as in de la Croix and Licandro (1999) and
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Strulik et al. (2013) would weaken the negative fertility effects and could, potentially,
even outweigh them.
So far, the average U.S. health share of 11.4% between 1960–2017 has been
used in the analysis. To gain additional insights into the relationship between life
expectancy and economic development, in Figure 7 we investigate the maximum
attainable 2017 life expectancy and level of p.c. output for τ ∈ [0, 1].



































Figure 7: p.c. output and life expectancy for τ ∈ [0, 1] (p.c. output: dashed blue
line; life expectancy: dotted red line)
As expected, we find a hump-shaped relationship. Also, for τ = 0 and τ = 1 zero
production takes place. For zero health investments, the survival probability and
the saving rate are zero and, thus, the capital stock and production are zero, too.
For small health shares, the gains in output as well as in life expectancy are large.
According to our model, a maximum output of ymax = 3.08 can be reached with a
tax rate of τ = 0.271. This corresponds to a life expectancy of 88.6 years. For larger
health shares, there is a steep decline in output. The logic behind is that, at some
point, the positive effects of increasing longevity are outweighed by the resource
demand of health care. Interestingly, life expectancy continues to increase way
beyond the growth maximizing tax rate. For τ = 0.734, a maximum life expectancy
of 92.9 years can be reached. The tradeoff in terms of economic development is,
however, huge. Compared to the growth-maximizing size of the health care sector,
an additional 3.85 years of life expectancy come at the cost of reducing p.c. output
by 38.2%.
Remark 5. Increasing the health share beyond its growth-maximizing size comes at
the cost of a steep decline in p.c. output, while the additional gains in life expectancy
are rather small.
Our results also contribute to the discussion surrounding rising health shares and
the consequent effects on economic development. Given that the average OECD
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health share has increased from 9.3% to 12.6% over the period 2000–2017 (World
Bank, 2019), we can, at least, be guardedly optimistic that this increase in absolute
and relative health expenditures did not only extend individual’s lives but also
fostered economic growth. This result contrasts Kuhn and Prettner (2016) who
include health care personnel and find a smaller optimal size of the health sector of
8.61% along the BGP. Since in our framework, the optimal health share decreases
over time and remembering that we abstract from human capital employed in health
care, a larger optimal size of the health sector is corollary.
Turning to the welfare effects of longevity-driven economic growth, Kuhn and
Prettner (2016) conduct an analysis on the tradeoff between life and growth and
find that it can be optimal to increase the size of the health care sector beyond
its growth growth-maximizing size. In principle, our results do not rule out this
conclusion, nonetheless, a thorough analysis including more generations would be
necessary to properly assess the welfare effects within our framework.
6 Conclusions
We introduce an endogenous survival probability into a growth framework driven
by purposeful R&D. The frequency at which new ideas are developed increases in
the level of aggregate savings and in the number of scientists employed. Higher
savings imply higher operating profits since more machines can be produced. This
raises the demand for and, thus, the wage rate of scientists, resulting in higher R&D
employment and faster economic progress.
Life expectancy increases in the public resources devoted toward health, which, in
turn, raises the incentives to save and to work more, while it induces a negative effect
on the fertility decision. We disentangle the separate channels and are able to show
that, overall, life expectancy exerts positive growth effects. The reduction in the size
of the labor force over time is overcompensated by higher labor force participation
and, especially, by higher savings and investments. Additionally, we show that the
growth-maximizing size of the health care sector is way smaller than the size that
would maximize life expectancy. Given that within the OECD, the average share
of the health care sector is substantially smaller than our growth-maximizing size,
devoting further resources toward health care might not only increase life expectancy
but also foster economic development.
Our model approach allows for several interesting extensions. We abrogate
from income-dependent education, which would, most likely, spur longevity-induced
growth effects. Also, including human capital employed in health care might pro-
21
vide additional interesting insights, as increases in life expectancy would draw away
labor from production and R&D and exert a potential negative effect on economic
growth. Related to that, dividing the health sector into health care personnel and
medical researchers could be a promising avenue for future research because it would
allow for a more realistic modeling of aging.
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